A British Boeing 737 is taking off from Manchester when its number one engine bursts into flame. The pilot aborts the takeoff, turns off the runway, smoke fills the passenger cabin, and 55 people die before they can exit the airplane. The detailed investigation that follows reveals that the flaw in the engine, the pilot's decision to take a right exist from the runway, the lethal gas contents of the smoke, some aspects of collective behavior, and the design of the exits caused the deaths.
One of the more admirable features of this series is the exemplary writing. It's clear and informative. The granular detail of the engine failure is explained in such a way that I, with only rudimentary knowledge of (or interest in) jet engine design, can follow it with no difficulty whatever.
Another appealing feature is the seamless way that computer-generated images are blended into the newsreel footage, so that sometimes it's not easy to tell whether you're watching a man-made cartoon or a bit of real film.
A psychologist is called to study passenger behavior and she replicates the conditions of the lethal accident. The work she does fall under the generic heading of "collective behavior" in social psychology. The subject is the behavior of people in masses. In this case the passengers were climbing over seats and over each other in order to escape the smoke, which was blinding and contained hydrogen cyanide, the same gas used to execute prisoners. They jammed up in a doorway that would accommodate only one passenger at a time.
It's a common problem and frequently has deadly results, not just in airplanes. The famous Coconut Grove night club fire in Boston killed 492 people. As in the case of this aircraft, the fire was extremely fast in spreading and produced toxic smoke. Some passengers had died at their tables with drinks in their hands. Most had died while piled up at the main exit -- a revolving door. The crowd pushed frantically against both sides of the door, locking it in place.
Crowds can also defeat themselves on the streets. Traffic lights are set to turn green in sequence for a car traveling at the speed limit. But drivers are usually so fast that they wind up clogged at red lights. The same is true for freeway exits.
In any case, a great deal was learned from the Manchester accident. The exits were redesigned, for instance, from 20 inches to 30 inches in width.
One of the more admirable features of this series is the exemplary writing. It's clear and informative. The granular detail of the engine failure is explained in such a way that I, with only rudimentary knowledge of (or interest in) jet engine design, can follow it with no difficulty whatever.
Another appealing feature is the seamless way that computer-generated images are blended into the newsreel footage, so that sometimes it's not easy to tell whether you're watching a man-made cartoon or a bit of real film.
A psychologist is called to study passenger behavior and she replicates the conditions of the lethal accident. The work she does fall under the generic heading of "collective behavior" in social psychology. The subject is the behavior of people in masses. In this case the passengers were climbing over seats and over each other in order to escape the smoke, which was blinding and contained hydrogen cyanide, the same gas used to execute prisoners. They jammed up in a doorway that would accommodate only one passenger at a time.
It's a common problem and frequently has deadly results, not just in airplanes. The famous Coconut Grove night club fire in Boston killed 492 people. As in the case of this aircraft, the fire was extremely fast in spreading and produced toxic smoke. Some passengers had died at their tables with drinks in their hands. Most had died while piled up at the main exit -- a revolving door. The crowd pushed frantically against both sides of the door, locking it in place.
Crowds can also defeat themselves on the streets. Traffic lights are set to turn green in sequence for a car traveling at the speed limit. But drivers are usually so fast that they wind up clogged at red lights. The same is true for freeway exits.
In any case, a great deal was learned from the Manchester accident. The exits were redesigned, for instance, from 20 inches to 30 inches in width.
