Hitler and the Invasion of Britain
- Episode aired Apr 7, 1998
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Hitler as Hamlet.
Dunkirk, 1940. It's interesting to watch the various presentations of the cross-channel retreat. The French sources leave the impression that the poilu was left behind, fighting a rear guard action, while their English friends neglected them, a kind of betrayal. The German source here pronounces the British fine soldiers, the most tenacious the Germans had come across in France. The British source, as here, gives the impression that although the Brits came first aboard the ships, many of the French were extracted as well, a kind of favor. Nobody comes right out and blames anybody else.
At any rate, Hitler soon owned continental Europe but in the aftermath of Dunkirk he had no intentions of invading England. He believed the Brits would sue for peace. In his view it was the sensible thing to do. Britain could have the sea and Germany the land. Between the two of them they would be unconquerable. "The British are an element of stability in the world. All I want is for them to recognize Germany's position on the continent." Hitler made offers of peace but Churchill realized that it would turn Britain into a satellite of Germany, acting as Germany's sea power in a way, so Churchill determined to fight on -- "on land, on the sea, in the hills," and so on. He demonstrated his ruthlessness by destroying the French fleet, killing 1250 sailors, at the port of Oran in Africa, to prevent its falling into German hands.
It convinced Hitler that Britain, or at least Churchill, must be subdued and he ordered preparations made for a cross-channel invasion of the British Isles, called "Operation Sealion," a rare occasion in which the German term is more euphonious that the English -- "SeeLöve." Since Germany had no landing craft, they assembled wide-beamed barges at the coast, only suitable if the channel were calm. Thousands of small fishing vessels were requisitioned. Some infantry would paddle rubber rafts.
In his history of the war, Chester Wilmot came across an assessment of the plans by a German strategist -- "I imagine it would be similar to a large river crossing." I crossed it, once on a hovercraft, and it did not resemble a large river crossing. The planning was the work of amateurs. The D-Day landings at Normandy illustrated what kind of massive strength was necessary for a cross-channel invasion, and even then there was extreme difficulty.
But during this period, after Drunkirt, the British of course waited as if on springs. They'd lost most of their equipment in France and the men were thinly spread along the coast. It was an atmosphere ripe for rumors. There were stories of German parachutists pretending to be Brits, some disguised as nuns. Of course Germany bombed England first, beginning with the RAF base and switching to London.
The Battle of Britain, won by the RAF, is generally credited with preventing the invasion but this program makes a convincing case that, even had the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority, Germany could not have stopped the British navy from destroying any landing fleet. Even the German high command were convinced. Nevertheless the shipping was kept in the launch ports as a bluff and Hitler never formally cancelled Operation Sea Lion.
By the Spring of 1941, Hitler's interests lay elsewhere. He believed that if he could crush Russia -- it was a rotten structure that would collapse once the door was kicked in -- Britain would have no choice but to recognize Hitler's hegemony, He moved more than half of his divisions from the West to the Russian border. In his conversations and conferences he no longer spoke about England. The Battle of Britain was political in its design, not military -- or so say the talking heads who were participants. The object was to cause an uprising that would get rid of Winston Churchill and substitute the more reasonable Lloyd George, so the conflict could be settled.
It often pointed out, correctly, that German airplanes outnumbered the British by two to one. However, most of the German aircraft were slow bombers and underarmed. The escorting German fighters used fuel at a rapid rate that left them only twenty minutes of time over the target. Still the belief that you can break the enemy's will by bombing was a popular belief at the time. It didn't work in Britain. It only drew the Brits closer together. A few years later it failed in Germany as well, with the same consequences. It's hasn't worked since then either. Short of extermination, it doesn't seem to work.
At any rate, Hitler soon owned continental Europe but in the aftermath of Dunkirk he had no intentions of invading England. He believed the Brits would sue for peace. In his view it was the sensible thing to do. Britain could have the sea and Germany the land. Between the two of them they would be unconquerable. "The British are an element of stability in the world. All I want is for them to recognize Germany's position on the continent." Hitler made offers of peace but Churchill realized that it would turn Britain into a satellite of Germany, acting as Germany's sea power in a way, so Churchill determined to fight on -- "on land, on the sea, in the hills," and so on. He demonstrated his ruthlessness by destroying the French fleet, killing 1250 sailors, at the port of Oran in Africa, to prevent its falling into German hands.
It convinced Hitler that Britain, or at least Churchill, must be subdued and he ordered preparations made for a cross-channel invasion of the British Isles, called "Operation Sealion," a rare occasion in which the German term is more euphonious that the English -- "SeeLöve." Since Germany had no landing craft, they assembled wide-beamed barges at the coast, only suitable if the channel were calm. Thousands of small fishing vessels were requisitioned. Some infantry would paddle rubber rafts.
In his history of the war, Chester Wilmot came across an assessment of the plans by a German strategist -- "I imagine it would be similar to a large river crossing." I crossed it, once on a hovercraft, and it did not resemble a large river crossing. The planning was the work of amateurs. The D-Day landings at Normandy illustrated what kind of massive strength was necessary for a cross-channel invasion, and even then there was extreme difficulty.
But during this period, after Drunkirt, the British of course waited as if on springs. They'd lost most of their equipment in France and the men were thinly spread along the coast. It was an atmosphere ripe for rumors. There were stories of German parachutists pretending to be Brits, some disguised as nuns. Of course Germany bombed England first, beginning with the RAF base and switching to London.
The Battle of Britain, won by the RAF, is generally credited with preventing the invasion but this program makes a convincing case that, even had the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority, Germany could not have stopped the British navy from destroying any landing fleet. Even the German high command were convinced. Nevertheless the shipping was kept in the launch ports as a bluff and Hitler never formally cancelled Operation Sea Lion.
By the Spring of 1941, Hitler's interests lay elsewhere. He believed that if he could crush Russia -- it was a rotten structure that would collapse once the door was kicked in -- Britain would have no choice but to recognize Hitler's hegemony, He moved more than half of his divisions from the West to the Russian border. In his conversations and conferences he no longer spoke about England. The Battle of Britain was political in its design, not military -- or so say the talking heads who were participants. The object was to cause an uprising that would get rid of Winston Churchill and substitute the more reasonable Lloyd George, so the conflict could be settled.
It often pointed out, correctly, that German airplanes outnumbered the British by two to one. However, most of the German aircraft were slow bombers and underarmed. The escorting German fighters used fuel at a rapid rate that left them only twenty minutes of time over the target. Still the belief that you can break the enemy's will by bombing was a popular belief at the time. It didn't work in Britain. It only drew the Brits closer together. A few years later it failed in Germany as well, with the same consequences. It's hasn't worked since then either. Short of extermination, it doesn't seem to work.
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- rmax304823
- Oct 25, 2016
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